

A N  
ADDRESS  
T O  
*BRITONS.*

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
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A N  
A D D R E S S  
T O  
*B R I T O N S.*



H A T Numbers of you  
have been frequently  
and for a long Series of  
Time Bought, is by  
too many of you known experi-  
mentally : That you have been  
also Sold, cannot be doubted by  
any of the least Discernment :

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And

And that you are now about to receive the Wages of Unrighteousness, and the Produce of this infamous Traffick, is too evident to be concealed, and of too interesting a Nature not to be laid to Heart.

The Question is not now, how we shall suppress the Depredations, or repel the Insults of the haughty *Spaniard*: How we shall support the Queen of *Hungary*: Or, if we are not a People bereft of common Sense, and devoted to Destruction, the Question is now no longer, how we shall defend or aggrandize *H.....r*: But the Question now is, By what Means we may preserve *Great Britain*, our own Country, and all that is therein dear and valuable to us?

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In order the more effectually to answer this Question, it will be necessary to take a short View of our melancholy Circumstances, and the Measures by which we were brought into them.

First, then, we are to consider, that, besides some petty Princes and States, three of the most powerful Monarchs in *Europe* are in League against us, and that we have not one Ally who assists us effectually, or whom we are not oblig'd to support at a vast Expence.

Not contented to lavish away our Money in Subsidies to almost any Prince who would receive it, for Troops, some of which neither could or would do us any Service, we have sent our *British* Forces abroad, in such Numbers, as to  
leave

leave our own Country quite destitute of Defence by Land; and this principally to secure a Barrier to the *Dutch*, who, instead of endeavouring to defend these Places for Themselves, have given many of them up in the most scandalous Manner imaginable; and prosecute the War with so little Vigour, as gives but too much Reason to believe they are very little, or not at all, concerned in the Event of it. How wisely the *Dutch* act in this Conduct I shall not now enquire.

However, the *French* taking Advantage of this Management, and their own great Superiority, have already over-run a considerable Part of the *Netherlands* with surprising Rapidity; and it is very observable, that they have neglected

lected the inland Towns, as *Mons*, *Namur*, and others, on that Side of the Country, and have clear'd their Way to the Sea Coast, by the Conquest of *Ghent* and *Bruges*, and are now besieging *Ostend*. This, no Doubt, is with a particular View of distressing Us, by cutting off the Intercourse between us and our Army; preventing our Troops from returning to their Country, and adding another Port to the many they are already possess'd of, from whence they may conveniently invade us. By this Means it is highly probable that our Army will be destroyed, or at least made Prisoners of War. When this is effected, who can doubt, a Moment, but the *French* will invade us: Their whole Management plainly indicates *that*  
to



to be their Design: And in such a Case, we are left only to the precarious Defence of our Ships: For if the *French* should land, even so small a Number as ten thousand Men here (Oh shocking Thought!) they may make a Conquest of this Island. So wise is our Conduct, that in Time of Peace it has been vehemently asserted, that upwards of thirty thousand Soldiers are necessary for our Security; but now we are at War with our nearest Neighbour, and the most formidable Powers in *Europe*, we are left with only five thousand to defend us.

When the great Number of Ports the *French* are possess'd of, from *Dunkirque* (perhaps by this Time I might say from *Ostend*) to *Brest*, all, in a Manner, opposite to our Coast,



Coast, and the narrow Channel which parts us, are considered; surely no Man in his Senses can doubt, but it is very possible for them to land a sufficient Body of Troops upon this Island, to subdue it. And common Report says, this is so firmly the Opinion of the best General the *French* now have, that he has offered to risk his Head on the Success of the Enterprize.

To take a View, tho' as short a one as possible, of some of the Causes of this our present unhappy Situation, it will be necessary to look back, at least, as far as the Beginning of our present War with *Spain*, which I make no doubt but the *French* brought us into. That politic Nation observing that we carried on a very advantageous

B                      Trade

Trade with *Spain*, no doubt, used all their Arts to set us at Variance, and were but too successful in their Endeavours. By making a Breach between us and *Spain*, the *French* plainly saw we should lose a valuable Trade, part of which, at least, they should gain. And it is far from being impossible, that they also foresaw, we should greatly weaken ourselves by ill concerted, and worse conducted Expeditions against the *Spanish* Dominions; and if they expected this, we took especial Care not to disappoint them; for it is evident we concerted some of our Expeditions very ill, and sent Persons to conduct them, by Land, who, in military Affairs, knew not their right Hands from their left. When

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we had suffered very considerable Losses at *Sea*, by so despicable a maritime Enemy as the *Spaniards*, and had greatly impoverished and enfeebled ourselves by our *American* Expeditions, and much more, perhaps, by Subsidies paid to foreign *Princes*; then the *French*, tho' somewhat sooner than they intended, (being precipitated into it by the Court of *Spain*) declared War against us. Our engaging in these Wars, and our Management of them, have principally conducted to bring us into our present wretched Condition.

When it was found that the *Spaniards* could not, by fair Means, be brought to make us Amends for the Injuries they had done to our Merchants; nor to desist from the



Depredations and Insults almost daily committed against them; if then our Merchants had been commissioned, and properly encouraged to make Reprisals, it cannot well be doubted, by the Success they have since had against a much more potent Enemy, but the haughty *Spaniard* would soon have been reduced to agree with us upon equitable Terms.

By this Means, a War with *Spain* might, very probably, have been prevented, and of Consequence a War with *France* also: Or if *France* had been determined on a War with us, had we been so wise to have confined that War to the *Sea*, we should, in all likelihood, have ruined the Trade of  
*France*



*France*, and been considerable Gainers by such a War.

It is certain that the Interest of *Great Britain* (whatever the Interest of any other Country might do) required of us to meddle no farther in a *Land War*, than by assisting the Queen of *Hungary*, and the King of *Sardinia* with Money. Or when the *French* made an Attack upon the *Netherlands*, (which, that they did, seems to be in a great measure owing to our Wisdom in drawing the War from *Germany* thither) if instead of acting as Principals, and sending such Numbers of our Troops to defend that Country, we had, when requested thereto, only supplied our Allies with what our Treaties obliged us to, we had then been  
courted

courted by them, whose Interest is much more nearly concerned in the Defence of those Countries, than ours is; and had spared ourselves the Shame, of preposterously solliciting a People to accept of our Assistance, and supplicating them to join their Troops with ours, to defend their own Dominions.

In Truth, our Attempt to save the *Netherlands*, from such numerous and powerful Armies (tho' they were very differently represented to us) as the *French* sent to attack them, was very injudicious; and every one plainly saw, except those who ought first to have seen it, that the Force provided for that purpose, or indeed any Force  
we

we were able to provide, was by no means equal to the Undertaking.

What could then induce Persons in their Senses, to make such a Sacrifice of Men and Treasure, as we have done, to accomplish what was next to an Impossibility? If they should answer, that they were not rightly informed of the Numbers and Strength of the *French* Armies; this may, indeed be easily credited: For tho' it is universally known and acknowledged, that nothing is more necessary in Time of War, than a thorough Knowledge as can possibly be obtained of the Designs, Preparations and Strength of the Enemy; and that our Success in the last War with *France*, was owing as much to the excellent Intelligence we then had, as to any  
one



one Incident whatever; yet this Practise, so universally known and acknowledged, and from which we formerly reaped so much Benefit, has been neglected in such a shameful Manner, as, perhaps, no Instances in History can parallel.

But defective as our Intelligence has been, it was impossible for us to be ignorant that we were not able to cope with the *French* in the *Netherlands*. I therefore repeat it, that the immense Loss of Ammunition, Cloathing, Artillery, Treasure and People we have there sustained, and what further we may sustain, has been merely a Sacrifice to——— *to what they best can tell who advised these fatal Measures.*

Tho' we have long been engaged in many pernicious Schemes, yet  
several



several Opportunities have been thrown in our Way, by some of which we might have greatly alleviated, and by others, perhaps, have intirely prevented, the ill Effects of those destructive Schemes.

In that wild Attempt at *Fontenoy*, if Orders judiciously given, had not, by some STRANGE FATALITY, been contradicted, the *French* might not have proceeded with the Rapidity they have done, in the Conquests they have since made : If at *Dettingen*, the Bravery of our Troops, which extricated us from the Danger some *Wise Heads* had brought us into, had not been unaccountably restrained from obtaining a Victory : If the *French* Fleet in our Channel had not been suffered to escape for

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Want

Want of Diligence, as Seamen say it was: If the united Squadrons of *France* and *Spain* had been destroyed in the *Mediterranean*, as every Body knows they might have been: If these Opportunities had been properly and effectually improved (as to the eternal Infamy and irreparable Loss of this Nation they were not) we might now have been at Peace with both *France* and *Spain*, and consequently in perfect Security.

In short, such Engagements and Treaties, directly opposite to the Interest of *Great Britain*, have been of late Years entered into: Such chimerical and impolitic, not to say wicked Projects, of Stadtholders, and partitioning of Princes Dominions to aggrandize *H. . . . . r*, have been  
formed,

formed, as has made all the World, except a few Powers who stand in the utmost Need of our Support, either our open or secret Enemies. And to compleat our Misfortunes, such Persons have been employ'd to command many of our Ships of War, and conduct some of her Squadrons, as thro' Mismanagement, Cowardice, or personal Pique, have lost such Opportunities of Serving, and indeed of Saving their Country, as we can never expect to retrieve.

And, if the destructive Measures we long since enter'd into, are still continued; particularly our engaging so deeply in a Land-War, and sending such Numbers of our Troops abroad; I say, if these fatal Measures are still pursued,



this cannot be owing to Ignorance in our present M. ....rs; for several of them, as M..b.rs of both H....s of P.....t, before they were taken into the M.....y, have, shewn to Demonstration, that these Measures were directly repugnant to the Interest of *Great Britain*, and that nothing but Views to a foreign Interest could occasion them to be pursued. Nevertheless, if they are by these very Men still pursued, and, if possible, with more Ardor than ever, From what Motive must this proceed! And what an Idea must this Conduct give us of Mankind! But if, with too many Men, *Honour* is esteem'd an empty Name, and a mere Phantome; if the Welfare of a Nation is by them disregarded, when brought



brought in Competition with their private Emoluments, let them, however, consider, that if this Nation becomes a Prey to *France* (as certainly it is in the utmost Danger of being) their great Estates will, in all Probability, subject them to become some of the first Victims of their Treachery to their Country. When *William* the *Norman* made a Conquest of this Kingdom, he soon dispossess'd the ancient Nobility and Gentry of their Estates, and bestow'd them upon his own Countrymen and Followers; and the like will certainly be done by any foreign Prince, who may now or hereafter subdue this Country. And I very heartily embrace this Opportunity of assuring my Countrymen in general, that my sincere

Opinion

Opinion is, If we should ever be so unhapny as to have the *Pretender*, or any of his Family, imposed upon us, to rule, or rather tyranize here, we should not fare at all better than under the Dominion of a foreign Prince, and, in Reality, be no other than a Province to *France*.

It is therefore to be hoped, that if, in this selfish Age, no other Motive will operate sufficiently with great Men to prefer the Good and Safety of their Country to all other Considerations, yet that Self-Preservation, at least, will have its due Effect on them.

The present Generation of Men, in our Country, have known little or nothing of the Calamities of War at Home; and the Hearing  
what

what others suffer Abroad makes but a slight Impression, even on the most Compassionate, if compared with the Horror that attends the Seeing and Feeling the Ruin and Devastation which are inseparable from this terrible Evil.

To see a victorious and insulting Enemy carrying away or destroying the Hopes of the Husbandman; extorting the Riches of the People from them by Threatnings and the most grievous Tortures; dishonouring the Women; burning Houses, Villages, Towns, and Cities, and massacring the Inhabitants, are what must be expected at the Beginning of a Conquest; and afterwards, those to whom this Enemy is graciously pleased to grant their Lives, must acquiesce with such a Religion



Religion, such Laws, and such a Government, or rather such a Tyranny, as the Conqueror shall please to impose upon them.

These, my Countrymen, you will say are Calamities indeed; and those among you, who are honest and not blind, will see and acknowledge we are in the utmost Danger of suffering. But you will now, perhaps, ask, What shall we do to be saved? I would hope this Question does not come too late. But certainly, at best, we have no Time to lose.

It seems to me, that our Preservation may be best effected, by Squadrons being immediately station'd in the *Downs*, at *Portsmouth*, and *Plymouth*, besides Cruisers on all our Coasts: Every Ship,  
as

as well as the several Squadrons, to be commanded by Persons of the most approved Conduct and Courage in the Nation. Our Troops in the *Netherlands* should be brought home, if that is possible. But whether that is practicable or not, a Militia should be raised throughout all the Kingdom, and well armed and disciplined ; Trains of Artillery provided, and those Places on the Coast where an Enemy may most conveniently land, should be fortified with Breast-works and Batteries : And the best Means should be used, let the Expence be what it will, to gain Intelligence, of the Preparations, and true Designs of our Enemies. These Measures, if immediately taken, may even prevent the Attempt of an Invasion ;

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fion, or at least it may, and undoubtedly will, render it fruitless.

But if after all, neither these, or any other salutary and effectual Measures should be taken for our Preservation, the Writer of this Address will, nevertheless, enjoy the Satisfaction of having discharged his Duty to his Country. And to do this fully, perhaps for the last Time, he takes this Opportunity to acquaint his Countrymen, that if they are saved from present Destruction, they cannot reasonably expect to continue in Safety, unless they become honest to themselves, and suffer no Consideration to come in Competition with the Good of their Country. They have seen some of the miserable Effects of Bribery and Corruption,



tion, without which it would have been impossible they should have been reduced to the Danger they are now in; and this, if any Thing will do it, must deter them from those pernicious Practises for the future.

Besides this general Observation, I must take Notice, that the Preservation of our Country will greatly depend upon two Particulars. The First is, that speedy and exemplary Punishments may be inflicted on all Persons, of what Degree, or Quality soever, who misbehave, or have misbehaved, in their Duty to their Country; and that such as distinguish themselves in its Service, may be amply rewarded. We have acted of late, as tho' we had forgot, or had never known that Rewards and

Punishments are the principal Springs of human Actions; or at least we have placed both Rewards and Punishments very preposterously; annexing the First to Actions which richly deserv'd the Last, and so on the contrary.

The second Method essentially necessary to our Preservation, is what has been above recommended for our present Defence; I mean the Establishment of a numerous, useful, well disciplined Militia; without which, our Safety must always be, at least, but precarious; and by which, it may be rendered as secure as human Means can make it.

Against this Establishment, the Reasons that are given are so weak, as hardly to deserve an Answer, and will be almost equally strong in every

every other Country in *Europe*; the Substance of them is, that the People have other Employment than learning and exercising the military Art; and it will put them to Inconveniencies. Have they so? and will it have that effect? But can the People be more usefully employed than in learning the Method to secure their Properties, Liberties and Lives; and are trifling Inconveniencies to be brought in Competition with the Loss of all that is valuable to them: This is just as if a Man in a Fever, advised to keep his Bed, and take a Vomit, should refuse both, because he had something else to do than lie a Bed, and would not be put to the Trouble of a Vomit. There is I know, a  
m.....l



m.....:..1 Objection against raising a useful Militia, which is a strong Reason why it should be done.

And now my Countrymen, I will end this short Address, by entreating that you will not be lulled into a false, and perhaps fatal Security, by being persuaded, that you are in little or no Danger; or, on the other Hand, be terrified into a Belief that your Destruction is inevitable: That the First is untrue, every Man of Understanding, who is at all acquainted with national Affairs, and will make Use of his Reason, must see; and that the latter is so, there is good Grounds to hope. Let us therefore, with the greatest Unanimity, instantly put in Practice, the most likely Means of our Preservation; and  
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shew the World, and our Enemies  
in particular, that *Great Britain*  
will not become an easy Prey to  
any Power upon Earth.

*F I N I S.*



[ 37 ]

ΔΙΧΤΗ



